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IntroductIon
the crimean operation has served as an occasion for russia 
to demonstrate to the entire world the capabilities and the 
potential of information warfare. Its goal is to use difficult 
to detect methods to subordinate the elites and societies in 
other countries by making use of various kinds of secret and 
overt channels (secret services, diplomacy and the media), 
psychological impact, and ideological and political sabotage. 
russian politicians and journalists have argued that infor-
mation battles are necessary for “the russian/Eurasian civi-
lisation” to counteract “informational aggression from the 
Atlantic civilisation led by the uSA”. this argument from the 
arsenal of applied geopolitics has been used for years. this 
text is an attempt to provide an interpretation of informa-
tion warfare with the background of russian geopolitical 
theory and practice.
All the federal television and radio channels, newspapers and 
a multitude of online resources have been employed in the recent 
disinformation campaign regarding the situation in Ukraine, 
which is being waged on an unprecedentedly large scale. The in-
formation front was supported by diplomats, politicians, political 
analysts, experts, and representatives of the academic and cultur-
al elites. This front, though, was many years in the making. At the 
time of the Ukrainian crisis (the Euromaidan), it was combined 
with ideological, political and socio-cultural sabotage, provocation 
and diplomatic activity. In short, multidirectional and complex 
measures were taken. Following the military occupation and in-
corporation of Crimea into Russia, the disinformation mechanisms 
were aimed at lending credibility to Moscow’s intentions and con-
cealing the gaps in the argumentation for the military moves and 
annexation of Crimea itself. These arguments were absurd, such 
as: it was feared that “Banderivtsy could storm into Crimea”, “the 
Black Sea Fleet bases could be taken over by NATO”, “Ukrainian 
citizens could be de-Russified”, and so on and so forth.
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The anti-Ukrainian information battles which had been seen for 
many years entered a tough phase of information warfare at the 
beginning of this year. They have been aimed primarily at desta-
bilising the situation in Ukraine and placing pressure on its gov-
ernment and citizens to adopt solutions regarding their country’s 
political system as proposed by Russia so that Ukraine could be 
controlled by Russia and remain within its sphere of influence. 
Another goal was to ‘obscure’ public opinion at home and world-
wide using a multitude of information channels.
Public opinion outside Russia had to choose between “Russian 
dominance in the post-Soviet area” or a “global Maidan” (total 
chaos). The spin doctors at home were asking whether Crimea 
should become another US state or an entity of the Russian Fed-
eration. In effect, the Kremlin’s informational aggression affected 
the Russian public most strongly and “the world’s greatest divided 
people”, i.e. Russian-speaking citizens of the states which were 
set up following the disintegration of the USSR. Western public 
opinion turned out to be the most resistant to Russian propagan-
da, although it has resonated with some people here as well. Some 
Western media and politicians agree with part of the arguments 
raised by Russian propaganda, including “Russia’s right to arrange 
the post-Soviet area” in line with its interests. the crimean op-
eration perfectly shows the essence of information warfare: 
the victim of the aggression – as was the case with crimea – 
does not resist it. this happened because russian-speaking 
citizens of ukraine who had undergone necessary psycholog-
ical and informational treatment (intoxication) took part in 
the separatist coup and the annexation of crimea by russia.
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MAIn PoIntS
•	 Russia’s information warfare theory has been developed in 
opposition to the new generation Western warfare concepts. 
This method of warfare is also used as an argument for the 
need to “respond with war to the information war waged 
against Russia.” In practice, information battles clearly draw 
upon the psychological warfare conducted in Soviet times and 
the techniques for influencing and leading the public tested at 
those times.
•	 The geopolitical doctrine treats information as a dangerous 
weapon: it is cheap, it is a universal weapon, it has unlimited 
range, it is easily accessible and permeates all state borders 
without restrictions. The information and network struggle, as 
well as its extreme forms, such as information-psychological 
warfare and netwars, are means the state uses to achieve its 
goals in international, regional and domestic politics and also 
to gain a geopolitical advantage. Representatives of geopolitical 
thought have to be given credit on the one hand for popularising 
this topic, and on the other for their personal participation in 
information warfare as opinion leaders. This in particular con-
cerns the key representatives of the two Russian geopolitical 
schools: Igor Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin, academic teachers 
and mentors of the young generations of geopoliticians.
•	 Furthermore, geopolitics offers ideological grounds for infor-
mation battles. In opposition to the ideology of liberalism, it 
promotes “a neo-conservative post-liberal power (…) strug-
gling for a just multi-polar world, which defends tradition, 
conservative values and true liberty.” The “Russian Eurasian 
civilisation” is set at contrast to the “Atlantic civilisation led by 
the USA” which allegedly intends to disassemble Russian state-
hood and gain global hegemony. The internal crisis in Ukraine 
followed by the need to annex Crimea have been presented in 
the context of the rivalry between these two civilisations.
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•	 The information strategy of the rivalry between Russia and 
the West is a product of both information geopolitics, which 
has been developed since the late 1990s, and the consistently 
pursued policy for strengthening the state and building its 
research and scientific, organisational, media, diplomatic, 
and social bases, et cetera. It is already used for both internal 
(mobilisation of society) and external purposes (reconstruct-
ing Russia’s spheres of influence in the post-Soviet area and 
Russia’s dominance in Eurasia). The information space where 
the Russian language is used and the existence of the Russian 
diaspora (who are receptive to the Kremlin’s propaganda) are 
the key factors which make successful action possible.
•	 Western public opinion is more resistant to Russian propagan-
da, although it has resonated with some people here as well. 
Moscow’s informational aggression is set to intensify: Russia 
has a sense of impunity on information battlefields. Further-
more, it is constantly modifying and perfecting its propa-
ganda techniques, taking into account new media tools and 
introducing innovations, such as activity in social networking 
services, etc.
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I. ruSSIAn InforMAtIon wArfArE thEory
1. the revival of the topic
Russian information warfare theory has a long tradition in Russia. 
It is derived directly from spetspropaganda (special propaganda) 
theory, which was first taught as a separate subject in 1942 at the 
Military Institute of Foreign Languages. The history of this insti-
tute is a spectacular example of the change in the Russian gov-
ernment’s approach to this subject. Spetspropaganda was removed 
from the curriculum in the 1990s to be reintroduced in 2000 after 
the institute had been reorganised. The institute is now known as 
the Military Information and Foreign Languages Department of 
the Military University of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian 
Federation. It trains specialists in ‘organising foreign informa-
tion and military communication,’ ‘information analysis’ and the 
‘monitoring and development of military information.’ Research 
in the area of spetspropaganda is also continued by the information 
security chair, whose students are primarily military personnel, 
and also journalists and war correspondents.
The institute underwent this thorough reform as a consequence 
of a rapid increase in interest in information security issues ini-
tiated by the work on the Information Security Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation announced in 2000. The reform above all cov-
ered the education facilities and research institutes which report 
to the ministries in charge of law enforcement (the Institute of 
Cryptography, Telecommunications and Computer Science at the 
Federal Security Service (FSB) Academy, the State Science and Re-
search Experimental Institute of Technical Information Protection 
Problems of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control 
(FSTEC), the Federal Protective Service (FSO) Academy in Orel, the 
Voronezh Research Institute of Telecommunications, the Academy 
of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry in Volgograd and Rostov-
on-Don, etc.). Information struggle theory has also been included 
in the curricula of higher education facilities which do not report 
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to those ministries and in projects conducted by research and sci-
ence institutes. This is coordinated by the FSB Academy’s Institute 
of Cryptography. The Scientific and Methodological Association of 
Higher Education Facilities of the Russian Federation Covering In-
formation Security, which is formed by 74 research and scientific 
institutions, was established upon the FSB Academy’s initiative1. As 
a result, diplomat training courses at the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO) and the Diplomatic Academy of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, as well as 
the curricula at sociology, philosophy and political science depart-
ments of other universities now include such subjects as: situation 
analysis, network communication technology, and information 
and network wars, and the subject of information warfare has been 
given the status of an academic science.
2. Building the ‘information front’ base
Russian information warfare theory also has traits of an in-
terdisciplinary applied science. This is because it covers a very 
broad range of actions (political, economic, social, military, in-
telligence, counterintelligence, diplomatic, propaganda, psycho-
logical, informational, communication technologies, education-
al, etc.). The numerous research centres created over the past 
decade are meant to deal with precisely defined issues. The In-
formation Security Institute established in 2003 at the Lomono-
sov Moscow State University specialises for example in informa-
tion security as part of Russia’s international co-operation, i.e. it 
is intended to resolve problems at a global level. The institute’s 
organisational form, as described on its website, is appropriate 
to the interdisciplinary nature of information security and the 
interministerial nature of the tasks being solved by it. The in-
stitute is headed by Vladislav Sherstyuk, former director of the 
1 This association is chaired by Professor A. P. Kovalenko from the FSB Acad-
emy’s Cryptography Institute (http://www.isedu.ru/sostav/vuzi.htm – ac-
cessed on 20 February 2014).
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Federal Agency of Government Communications and Informa-
tion (FAPSI).
The human resources required to resolve regional problems are 
trained for example by the Information and Analytical Centre for 
Studying Socio-Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Area, which 
was created as part of the Chair for Near Abroad History at the 
Lomonosov University. In addition to studying the contemporary 
political and economic history of the countries which emerged 
following the collapse of the USSR, the centre’s key research ar-
eas include: studying the Russian-speaking diaspora, their politi-
cal parties and social movements and how they co-operate with 
Russian parties and social movements, as well as the historical 
analysis of post-Soviet ethnic issues. In turn, its defined priority 
areas of activity are: applied research projects, information space 
monitoring and ensuring information security to the operation of 
state structures. The centre is directed by Yefim Pivovar, rector 
of the Russian State University for the Humanities. This proves 
that the intellectual effort of various academic centres is being 
united and coordinated. Pivovar’s major areas of research are: the 
history of the Russian emigration, the history of countries in the 
near abroad and integration processes in the post-Soviet area. It is 
worth noting that Maxim Meyer (a specialist in media strategies, 
who since 2007 has served as the executive director of the Russ-
kiy Mir Foundation, which supports ethnic Russians living out-
side Russia) has given lectures at the Chair for Post-Soviet Abroad 
Countries, which is directed by Mr Pivovar.
3. General characteristics of information warfare 
theory
The Russian theory has been built in opposition to cyber security 
theory developed in the United States and Western Europe pri-
marily concerning the use of new computer technologies for mili-
tary and intelligence purposes, i.e. activity in cyberspace. This 
involved transferring Western terminology across to the Russian 
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world. When it was being adapted to Russian reality, strong em-
phasis was put on the “defensive” nature of the Russian theory. 
The Russian terminology is confusing as a consequence of this 
manipulative trick. This has been confirmed by a critical review 
of the key terms. They cannot be made to fit in with any of the 
definitions used in the West. The terms ‘cybernetic warfare’, 
‘information warfare’ and ‘network warfare’2 have complete-
ly different meanings in Russia. Only few theoreticians make the 
distinction between ‘cyberwar’ and ‘netwar’ as manifestations 
of the technological and social dimensions of fourth generation 
warfare. However, this generally concerns publications which 
discuss Western publications. In turn, most russian authors un-
derstand ‘information warfare’ as influencing the conscious-
ness of the masses as part of the rivalry between the different 
civilisational systems adopted by different countries in the 
information space by use of special means to control infor-
mation resources as ‘information weapons’. They thus mix the 
military and non-military order and the technological (cyber-
space) and social order (information space) by definition, and 
make direct references to ‘Cold War’ and ‘psychological warfare’ 
between the East and the West.
In effect it is a term usually placed in two contexts: (1) the tasks set 
as part of the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Feder-
ation and (2) the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West 
(above all, the USA and NATO), and it has a political, an ideological 
and a cultural dimension.
Its technological dimension is marginalised and pushed out of 
public space. One proof of this was the debate taking place in 
2012 and 2013 on the ‘cybersecurity Strategy’ put forward by 
2 See for example: Основы информационно-психологической безопасно-
сти, под ред. В.А. Баришпольца. Москва, Знание, 2012; Атаманов Г.А., 
Информационная война: экспликация понятия (http://naukaxxi.ru – ac-
cessed on 13 March 2013).
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Senator Ruslan Gattarov3. According to specialists from the 
Russian Security Council and secret services, this strategy ex-
cessively narrowed down the information security topic. Cy-
berspace security is seen as a fragmentary term, although it is 
emphasised that new technologies have expanded the arsenal 
of means used to influence public opinion. The technological as-
pect (cyber-), which is underrepresented in the public space, is 
evidently kept confidential.
4. Information warfare in russian geopolitical doctrine
The functional (“war on information warfare against Russia”) and 
the geopolitical contexts are closely interrelated. The geopolitical 
doctrine treats information as a dangerous weapon (it is cheap, it 
is a universal weapon, it has unlimited range, it is easily accessible 
and permeates all state borders without restrictions). The infor-
mation and network struggle (more frequently, the information-
psychological struggle), including its extreme forms, such as in-
formation-psychological warfare and netwars, are means the state 
uses to achieve its goals in international, regional and domestic 
politics and also to gain a geopolitical advantage. Representatives 
of geopolitical thought have to be given credit on the one hand for 
popularising this topic, and on the other for their personal partici-
pation in information warfare as political technologists4 and opin-
ion leaders. This in particular concerns the key representatives of 
the two Russian geopolitical schools: Igor Panarin5 and Aleksandr 
3 Ruslan Gattarov (born 1977), an activist of the Young Guard of United Rus-
sia, later elected as the chairman of the Chelyabinsk committee of United 
Russia. He served as senator from 2010 and the chairman of the Commission 
for the Progress of Information Society at the Federation Council and the 
chairman of the Council for Work on Blogosphere, which was established 
at United Russia’s presidium. He stepped down as senator in February 2014 
and was then nominated deputy governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast. 
4 A political technologist is a specialist in the practical application of political 
technologies, political management, image-building campaigns and elec-
tion campaigns.
5 Igor Panarin (born 1958), holder of a higher doctoral degree in political sci-
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Dugin6, academic teachers and mentors of the young generations of 
geopoliticians. They have obvious links to the secret services and 
see the ‘mirror’ moves of the opponent as organised and channelled 
actions and more sophisticated than those used during the Cold 
War period. While sensitising the Russian public to external infor-
mational threats, they are also formatting the Russian information 
counteraction system. They are both theoreticians and practition-
ers of information warfare: they take an active part in publicist and 
analytical programmes on Channel One, Rossiya, NTV, Ren-TV and 
TV RT, and also on the radio (Panarin, for example, hosts his own 
programmes ‘Global politics’ and ‘The window to Russia’ on the 
Voice of Russia radio station, where he comments on current affairs 
in international politics).
5. the Panarin school
The early writings of Professor Igor Panarin of the Diplomatic Acad-
emy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation7 
ences and PhD in psychology, full member of the Military Academy of Sci-
ences of the Russian Federation and numerous expert bodies attached to the 
president and the Federation Council. He started his professional career in 
the Soviet Union’s KGB in 1976. After 1991, he worked at FAPSI; in 1999–2003, 
he was the head of the analytical department of the Central Election Com-
mittee. At present, he is a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs of Russia. He also teaches at MGIMO and the Russian 
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. 
6 Aleksandr Dugin (born 1962), a political scientist, geopolitician, philoso-
pher and historian of religion. In the early 1990s, he was the editor-in-chief 
of Elementy and Milyi Angel magazines and the editor of the manifesto of the 
Arctogeia publishing house. At present, he serves as professor at the sociol-
ogy and philosophy department of the Moscow Lomonosov University and 
the director of the Centre for Conservative Studies at Moscow State Univer-
sity. He has written more than ten books and hundreds of articles published 
in the Russian and foreign press. He is a leading representative of Russian 
geopolitics. Dugin is the main ideologist of integral traditionalism, Eura-
sianism, neo-imperialism, National Bolshevism and Russian conservatism. 
All the theories he throws to the ideological market share the underlying 
geopolitical thesis of the existence of two “superior civilisations”: the Land 
and the Sea civilisations, which are doomed to rivalry. He is the founder of 
the Eurasian Youth Union and the International Eurasian Movement. 
7 ‘Психологичекие аспекты обеспечения национальной безопасности Рос-
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laid the foundations for the Information Security Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation. His later works8 provided grounds for Russia’s 
need to counteract the West on the information front. Professor 
Panarin distinguishes two great waves of information aggression 
against “Russia-Ruthenia”: the first one began with perestroika and 
ended in the collapse of the USSR; and the second one commenced 
at the start of this millennium and in his opinion will last until 
2020, when the Good (i.e. the Russian Eurasian idea) will win.
In his book ‘Information World War II – War against Russia’9, 
Panarin claimed that all the so-called ‘colour’ revolutions in the 
CIS area and the ‘Arab Spring’ were a product of social control 
technology and information aggression from the United States. In 
his opinion, the protest movement on Bolotnaya Square in Mos-
cow after the recent parliamentary and presidential elections 
was also a manifestation of this aggression: de facto a result of 
the Western operation codenamed ‘Anti-Putin’ controlled from 
abroad. In the context of the ‘velvet revolutions’, he defines the 
basic terms used in information warfare technology for Russian 
purposes. In practice these are operations of influence, such as: 
social control, i.e. influencing society; social manoeuvring, i.e. 
intentional control of the public aimed at gaining certain benefits; 
information manipulation, i.e. using authentic information in 
a way that gives rise to false implications; disinformation, i.e. 
spreading manipulated or fabricated information or a combina-
tion thereof; the fabrication of information, i.e. creating false 
information, and lobbying, blackmail and extortion of desired 
information.
сии’ (ч. 1, 1995; ч. 2, 1996); ‘Психологическая безопасность войск’ (1996); 
‘Информационная война и Россия’ (2000). 
8 ‘Технология информационной войны’ (2003); ‘Информационная война 
и Третий Рим’ (2005); ‘Информационная война и дипломатия’ (2004), 
‘Информационная война и геополитика’ (2006); ‘Первая информацион-
ная война. Развал СССР’ (2010).
9 ‘Вторая мировая информационная война – война против России’ (2012).
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Panarin’s books also provide an outline of the basic instruments 
of the information struggle, which he divides into the catego-
ries of secret and open. These include: propaganda (black, grey 
and white), intelligence (the service which collects information 
about the opponent), the analytical component (media monitor-
ing and current situation analysis), the organisational compo-
nent (coordination and steering channels, secret agents influenc-
ing the media which shapes the opinion of politicians and mass 
media to take the shape desired by the state involved in informa-
tion warfare, and other combined channels, including special 
operation forces (sabotage operations conducted under a foreign 
flag). Complex operations managed from a single centre, which the 
author calls ‘the information KGB’, are organisational forms of in-
formation warfare. They are conducted by ‘information spetsnazes’.
Panarin distinguishes the following stages in the process of in-
formation operation management:
(1) forecasting and planning,
(2) organisation and stimulation,
(3) feedback,
(4) operation adjustment,
(5) performance control.
“The national information warfare system which both secretly 
and openly controls communication processes must be adequate 
to the modern global reality. Based on the best Soviet experiences, 
it must be enriched by the US and Chinese experiences,” he said 
during the presentation of his latest book ‘Information Warfare 
and Communications’10. Referring to the recent developments 
10 See: Презентация книги Панарина ‘Информационная война и коммуни-
кации’ (http://ria.ru/ announce/20140303/).
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in Ukraine, he claimed that the Ukrainian public protest (the Eu-
romaidan) was an element of the anti-Russian campaign artifi-
cially planned by the West.
Panarin announced his geopolitical project in his book ‘Informa-
tion Warfare and Geopolitics’ (2006). Analysing Russian history 
from the point of view of global geopolitics, he concluded that the 
success of all geopolitical projects was inextricably linked to ad-
vantage in information warfare. The “US-British empire” has had 
this advantage in contemporary history (since the collapse of the 
USSR). Panarin believes that this empire is now on the edge of 
the abyss and is doomed to collapse. He proposes a new union of 
states, extending from Egypt to China, as a counterbalance to this 
falling empire. The Eurasian Ruthenia would be at the core of this 
union of states.
6. the dugin school
The ‘colour revolutions’11 have also contributed to the stunning 
career of the term ‘netwar’. They are viewed in Russia as “arti-
ficial processes plotted in the West aimed at destabilising entire 
regions in the post-Soviet area,” “a disassembly of Russian state-
hood” and also as “socially the most dangerous form of encounter 
between intelligence services”12. This term was introduced in Rus-
sia by Aleksandr Dugin in his work ‘Post-modern Geopolitics”13, 
where he gave a closer look at the US concept of net-centric war-
fare. Using the base term ‘net-centric warfare’, which means 
the creation of a new information military infrastructure involv-
ing interactive elements and fast communication means, he cre-
ated the ‘Eurasian’ netwar model. The ‘Eurasian network’ would 
11 This term has been used to describe the social movements in Georgia (2003), 
Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), which brought about socio-political 
changes in these countries. 
12 See for example: Манойло А.В., ‘Государственная информационная поли-
тика в особых условиях’, Москва 2003, page 293. 
13 Aлександр Дугин, ‘Геополитика постмодерна’ (rossia3.ru). 
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offer a symmetric response to the ‘net-centric challenge from the 
US.’ According to Dugin, a “special group consisting of senior of-
ficials, the best ‘mission-oriented’ (Russian пассионарные) staff 
from the Russian secret services, intellectuals, scientists, po-
litical scientists and the corps of patriotically-oriented journal-
ists and culture activists” must be created for this purpose. The 
‘Eurasian network’ model in opposition to the ‘Atlantic network’ 
is expected to combine the basic elements of US postmodernism 
and net-centric approach with Russian reality. The symmetric 
Atlantic-American vectors of “information offensive” would be 
oriented in the precisely reverse direction. This model could be 
successful on the condition that the Russian armed forces, secret 
services, political institutions, information and communica-
tion systems, etc. were ‘postmodernised’. “Unless Russia makes 
this effort, it will be doomed to further defeats in clashes with 
the orange network technologies.” A netwar can only be won if 
the country uses network means, and these need to be adapted 
to Russia’s own reality and goals, and effective technologies, ac-
cording to Dugin’s diagnosis.
7. the ideological ‘engine’ of information struggle
These two geopoliticians offer ideological foundations for the 
struggle to gain an informational advantage. The neo-conserva-
tism ideology proposed by Dugin in his book ‘The Fourth Political 
Theory’14 can be summarised as follows. There is only one pre-
dominant ideology in the West. This ideology is liberalism which 
is based on individualism, technocracy and globalism. Geopo-
litically, this ideology is inherent in Americentrism and Atlantic 
partnership (NATO). When the USSR collapsed, liberalism de-
feated the last 20th century ideology (communism) to remain the 
sole ideology on the global arena. Today liberalism has come to 
the end of its capabilities, and the sole reason for its existence is 
its struggle against Russia: Russia as the enemy gives meaning to 
14 Aлександр Дугин, ‘Четвертая политическая теория’, 2009.
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the struggle for open society and makes it possible for the liberals 
to become consolidated.
The fourth theory (as opposed to liberalism, communism and 
fascism, which were the predominant ideologies in the 20th cen-
tury) is expected to set up a neo-conservative post-liberal ide-
ological superstate. “Russia is not and will not be a pre-liberal 
power. It is a post-liberal revolutionary force struggling for a just 
multipolar world, for genuine dignity and freedom. In its war on 
liberalism Russia will defend tradition, conservative values and 
true liberty.”
Panarin’s ideological thought is less subtle. He agrees with 
Dugin’s thesis that the theory of liberalism and the ‘liberal em-
pire’ have run their course and the thesis of Russia’s leadership 
in the 21st century global political processes. However, as a mat-
ter of fact, his ideological component of the geopolitical doctrine 
is based on the “state-building and superpower dominants in the 
awareness of Russians. In his work ‘Information Warfare and the 
World’ he openly admits that the Russian idea was formulated 
by Vladimir Putin in 1999 in his manifesto ‘Russia at the Turn of 
the Millennium’. President Putin based it on Russian patriotism, 
its superpower status and social solidarity15. Panarin is also less 
consistent than Dugin as regards ideological issues. Initially, he 
presented them as the triad of spirituality, super power status 
and dignity. However, during the presentation of his latest book, 
he suggested a new ideological triad: spiritual-, state- and cyber-
sovereignty.
The term ‘netcode’ is inherent in the ideological dimension of in-
formation warfare. One of Dugin’s students writes, for example: 
“Those who understand the netcode manage the processes, the 
motivation of ethnic groups and entire populations of countries, 
15 И. Панарин, Л. Панарина, ‘Информациoнная война и мир’. Москва 2003, 
page 350.
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and foment the conflict for their own purposes”16. The US netcode 
(global hegemony and disassembly of Russian statehood) is op-
posed to the Russian netcode. At present, the triumph of the ‘Rus-
sian code’ is frequently ascertained (the symbolic expressions 
of which are the political myths, such as the ‘Russian march’ or 
the ‘Russian spring’). The well-known blogger, Nikolai Starikov, 
co-president of the Velikoye Otechestvo party17, wrote recently18: 
“Our ‘Russian code’ works perfectly owing to President Putin’s 
achievements which (…) have woken up people’s layers of the sub-
conscious mind (…) and have led to the building up of a critical 
mass of citizens of Russian Civilisation.”
“Making ideology part of psychological warfare was a Soviet in-
novation, turning this into a massive and universal warfare. An-
other innovation was the incessant use of psychological weapons. 
The point is that peacetime never exists for the government in 
Moscow,” Pierre Nord wrote in 1971.19 The words of this French 
specialist in disinformation and psychological intoxication ap-
pear to still be valid today.
8. the Eurasian project vs. the ukrainian issue
Russia has been incessantly engaged in information and psycho-
logical war against Ukraine for years. From the very beginning 
this has been a war against the ‘orange plague’ (a widespread prop-
aganda stereotype). It ensured support for the blue team of Viktor 
Yanukovych in 2003/2004, and helped him win the presidential 
election (2010). This war has a geopolitical background: Russia, 
while building Eurasia as its vast sphere of influence (if possible, 
stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic), with Moscow in the 
16 Валерий Коровин, ‘Сетевая война США в Чечне’, Северный Кавказ, № 46-
47, November 2008.
17 The Great Fatherland Party.
18 See: Zavtra, 13 March 2014.
19 Pierre Nord, ‘L’Intoxication’. Quotation from Vladimir Volkoff, ‘La désinfor-
mation – arme de guerre’, Paris 1986. 
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centre, has faced the problem of a sovereign Ukraine, whose loca-
tion has left it suspended between the East and the West. Dugin 
has been ostentatiously calling for Ukraine to be divided for years, 
treating it as a seasonal and lame state. In his opinion, there are 
peoples who represent opposing geopolitical orientations: ethnic 
Great Russians and the culturally identical Little Russians, ori-
ented towards links with Russia versus the culturally distinct 
Western Ukrainian people who are representatives of the West-
ern European cultural area. “Cultural differences do not always 
coincide with territorial divisions; in this case the division line 
will cut through the territory, the land. We have always wanted 
this line to run as close to the west as possible, while the geopoliti-
cians in Washington are trying to find a way to push it as much 
to the east as possible. This is what the Ukrainian issue is like. 
Anyone who says it is not like this is either being diplomatic or is 
not sufficiently informed,”20 he wrote in 2009.
He outlined three concrete strategies for the integration of 
Ukraine already in 2013:
Scenario 1.
Ukraine is divided into two zones: western and south-eastern. He 
argued that this was due to the risk of civil war which was alleg-
edly imminent in Ukraine.
Scenario 2.
This scenario envisages a complicated game with a pragmatic 
Ukrainian government aimed at convincing it to join the Eura-
sian integration project either under duress of circumstances or 
tempted by promises of political, economic and energy benefits 
(in Dugin’s opinion, this would be a bloodless scenario, possible to 
implement during a socio-economic crisis in Ukraine).
20 ‘Dugin radzi – bracia Ukraińcy, podzielcie się’ (http://www.eprudnik.pl/
dugin-radzi; http://kresy24.pl/45590/podział-ukrainy-juz-przesadzony).
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Scenario 3.
This is a “vanguard” scenario as defined by Dugin or, to use Cold 
War terminology, a “subversive scenario”. It envisages using 
Western Ukrainian nationalists. “Western Ukrainians by defi-
nition and in line with the traditional classification do not share 
the values of liberalism, individualism, tolerance, multicultural-
ism, human rights ideology and other post-modernist standards 
predominant in modern Western society. Ukrainian nationalism 
is the main obstacle to the implementation of the Eurasian inte-
gration project. However, the attempt has to be made to turn the 
poison into a cure and the enemy into a friend, since the Eurasian 
Union is conceived of as being a model which respects the tradi-
tion and the cultural distinctiveness of individual communities 
and peoples”21.
The internal crisis in Ukraine, as a consequence of the Euromaid-
an, has been viewed by both Dugin and Panarin as a turning point 
giving Russia a sudden stimulus to embark on its ‘geopolitical 
march’ as Dugin put it.
21 Александр Дугин, ‘Евразийский проект и его украинская проблема’ 
(http://odnako.org/magazine/material/evraziyskiy-proekt-i-ego-ukrains-
kaya-problema/)
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II. InforMAtIon wArfArE In GEoPolItIcAl 
PrActIcE
1. ‘the technology of victory’
During the formal meeting held at the Kremlin on 18 March 2014on 
the occasion of the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Fed-
eration, President Putin spoke about “unprofessional and cynical 
Western moves destabilising the situation in Ukraine” and con-
trasted it to “peaceful action taken by Russia.” Along with care-
fully selected members of both houses of parliament, those pre-
sent at the meeting also included the heads of the secret service, 
members of the Security Council, diplomats led by Sergey Lavrov, 
the two leading representatives of geopolitics: Dugin and Panarin, 
as well as Dmitry Kiselev and other representatives of the media 
who had served the government well, secret service veterans, in-
cluding Yevgeny Primakov, and representatives of cultural and 
academic circles. All politicians and officials who had contributed 
to the success of the ‘Crimean operation’ were present there. This 
was symbolic confirmation of the fact that secret and open sabo-
tage and diplomatic channels as well as a successful media strate-
gy had been in play in taking control over Crimea and its annexa-
tion. On the same day, Professor Panarin addressed a note entitled 
‘The Technology of Victory’ to his discussion group on VKontakte 
portal (Panarin VK, 18 March 2014), in which he instructed his 
students as follows:
1. “It should be especially strongly emphasised that, in compari-
son to August 2008, Russia took many precautions in Crimea to 
prevent the planned violent scenario from being implemented.
2. Russia has found a recipe to counteract the colour revolutions 
which take the form of political coups.
3. The world has been offered an alternative path of develop-
ment, which is based on spiritual and ethical values.
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4. The Spirit of Valour has become crystallised: it has been pos-
sible to direct the accumulated impulse of Berkut’s valour into 
the right channel.
5. Russia’s comprehensive actions on all fields of the counterac-
tion of information (diplomatic, financial and economic, mili-
tary, etc.) have been conducted in close coordination with and 
directed personally by Vladimir Putin.”
Panarin consistently classified the Crimean operation as an ele-
ment of ‘defensive’ information warfare. He admitted that this had 
been a combined (media, diplomatic, financial-economic and mili-
tary), planned and coordinated operation. He suggested indirect-
ly and metaphorically that there should be a consolidation of the 
Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, emphasising as he did so 
Berkut’s engagement and ‘valour’ in this operation. He emphasised 
in the header of his ‘Technology of Victory’ note that Russia had not 
encountered any major obstacles while implementing its plans.
Representatives of the Russian media and secret services have 
made statements in a similar vein. Dmitry Kiselev announced 
on Channel 1 and on Rossiya-24 TV stations that “Barack Obama 
turned grey with fear.” He also boasted that “Russia is the only 
power capable of turning the United States into radioactive dust.” 
General Aleksandr Mikhailov, former head of the FSB’s Direc-
torate for Contacts with the Public, summed up the operation 
by stating the precise date of the opponent’s defeat: 16 March 
(the date of the Crimean referendum)22. He specified the key el-
ements of the ‘Crimean’ information war: the psychological fac-
tor, President Putin’s personal involvement, blackmail and sanc-
tions. “Information warfare has a multitude of components, both 
in real life and in virtual reality, elements of blocking the oppo-
22 ‘Генерал-майор Михайлов об инфвойнах: Cобака лает, караван идет, но 
мы не верблюды’ (http://www.pravda.ru/news/society/21-03-2014/1201182-
war-0/?m...). 
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nent’s influence and elements of pressure (creating influence),” 
he concluded. the quotations provided above confirm the 
opinion expressed by western theoreticians: the balance of 
profits and losses sustained as a consequence of information 
warfare is inessential; instead, it is important how this re-
sult is presented. The propaganda message was clear: President 
Putin fulfilled his plan with success; and this was success on the 
global scale.
2. Propaganda as the basic instrument of information 
operations
Influence blocking and the application of pressure are notions 
used in information struggle technology and social control. Spets­
propaganda, as we may see for ourselves, is the key instrument of 
this struggle: recent Russian information battles make clear ref-
erences to those fought during the Cold War. They have also been 
conducted in line with the sociotechnical principles of successful 
propaganda, such as the principle of massive and long-lasting 
impact (the ‘orange plague’ and ‘Banderivtsy’ propaganda stereo-
types have been incessantly reiterated since 2003), the principle 
of desired information (Russians and Russian-speaking people 
expect that their rights should be protected, so they believed the 
manipulated information that the Russian language had been 
banned), the principle of emotional agitation (bringing the 
recipients of the message to a condition in which they will act 
without much thought, even irrationally), the clarity principle 
(the message is simplified, uses black-and-white terms, and is full 
of loaded keywords, such as Russophobe), the principle of sup-
posed obviousness (causing the propaganda thesis to be associ-
ated with created political myths: the Russian spring equals pat-
riotism, Banderivtsy equals fascism, Maidan equals chaos, etc.).
Given Russian reality, where the state controls most of the tra-
ditional media (television, radio and newspapers), propaganda 
techniques can be used without any major obstacles. The news 
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presented in them is moderated by political technology specialists, 
who decide which information could help achieve certain goals, 
and which should be blocked as harmful. The situation in online 
social networking media, where the users themselves can create 
information, is quite different. Independent information can be 
found on blogs, discussion forums, Twitter, Facebook, etc. These 
sources provide information in real time and have become influen-
tial opinion-forming media, since they enable interaction between 
the users. Computer tools also enable automatic replication of in-
formation and propaganda memes to any posts and addresses.
3. network propaganda operations
Social networking media are viewed as the main sector of ‘anti-
Russian’ propaganda since they offer the possibility to post alter-
native information and to exchange opinions in public. The portals 
and online discussion groups on Runet are an object of organised 
action, which has been a known fact for a long time23. One example 
of this action is the netwar portal http://rossia3.ru/. On 10 March, 
Aleksandr Dugin posted a text entitled ‘The Rules of Polemics with 
the Internal Enemy’, instructing that: “It is obvious that we have 
two camps in our country: the patriotic camp (Putin, the people 
and US) and the liberal-Western camp (THEY, you know who). 
WE want a Russian Crimea and a Russian Ukraine, and oppose 
the USA, NATO and liberalism. If necessary, we will also support 
war (although the softer way is better to secure our strategic in-
terests). THEY declare themselves against war, for a free Ukraine 
(free from us), against Putin (as a patriot), for liberalism, the ‘civi-
lised West’, the USA and the EU. We are Russians and we support 
Russians, while THEY are against Russians. A system of synonyms 
to be used in polemics should be developed. However, it should be 
kept in mind that such synonyms need to be symmetrical. For ex-
23 See for example: Анна Полянская, Андрей Кривов, Иван Ломко, ‘Вирту-
альное око старшего брата. Попытка исследования’ (2003) – royallib.ru, 
gramoty.com; ‘Цепные собаки зоны Ру’, Новая газета, 23 October 2009; 
‘Где живут тролли. И кто их кормит’, Новая газета, 7 September 2013.
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ample, THEY call us ‘patriots’, and WE in response use the terms 
‘liberals’ and ‘Westerners’ (Russian западники). If THOSE WHO 
ARE NOT US call us ‘nationalists’, communists’, ‘Soviet’, then our 
response will be: ‘agent of US influence’ and ‘fifth column’. If they 
use the term ‘Nazi’ or ‘Stalinist’, our cold-blooded response should 
be ‘spy’, ‘traitor’, ‘how much did the CIA pay you?’ or ‘death to spies’. 
If THEY start immediately from the ‘Russian fascist’ or ‘Stalinist’ 
level, let novice but aggressive polemists respond to them. Such ar-
guments are used by intellectually limited people, so entering into 
a discussion with them is a waste of time. An automatic patriotic 
trolling software, demotivators, memes and virus video showing 
Navalny in front of the US embassy or the ugly mugs of the editors 
of Echo Moskvy or similar visual agitation materials for beginner 
level patriots could also be used against them.”
The analysis of this instruction and opinions expressed by par-
ticipants of the ‘information front’ online provide even greater 
grounds for the conclusion that the rules of online propaganda are 
the same as the ones used in traditional media. Net propaganda is 
based on the disinformation, manipulation, information fabrica-
tion, verbal provocation and intimidation techniques described by 
Panarin. Emotional and hateful language is used in online news 
and polemics. They contain numerous obscenities and abusive vo-
cabulary, such as ‘pederast’ or ‘liberast’. Biased and tendentious 
interpretations of events are also highly prominent in them. The 
cult of Putin as Russia’s successful leader and defender is clearly 
visible. The picture of the world is simplified and painted in black 
and white (where the diabolic West is black, and Russia is white). 
The image of the ideological opponent is clear and deprived of 
empathy. The opponent is discredited not only ideologically but 
also aesthetically (‘that Bandera creep’, ‘the editors’ ugly mugs’). 
Propaganda also performs discrediting (opponents) and the ac-
crediting (inspirer) functions. These functions have an impact on 
its role in image-building (PR), agitation and propaganda. It needs 
to be stated in this context that russian strategic innovations 
concern primarily the ‘organisational component’: since 
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there is no civil society in russia, informational ‘spetsnazes’ 
(as defined by Panarin) are formed by polittechnologists and so-
called ‘opinion leaders’. The aforementioned ‘netwar portal’ is 
at the same time the portal of the Eurasian Youth Union, a para-
military youth organisation founded by Dugin in 2008. Network 
Headquarters is its chief authority.
4. ‘the dugin network’
The netwar portal http://rossia3.ru/ is linked to the International 
Eurasian Movement’s portal http://evrazia.org/ and the netwar 
portal of the National Bolshevik Party http://nbf.rossia3.ru. This 
in turn contains links to http://nb-info-ru, i.e. the information 
portal of the National Bolshevik Party and its numerous network 
clones [http://nppinfo.com, http://nbpinfo.com, http://nazbol.
org, http://нацболру.рф, http://nbkurs.ru], and to http://oprich-
nsk.narod.ru (the website of Ivan the Terrible Brotherhood’s 
‘Oprichnina’) and http://patriot-af.livejournal.
The news and analytical portal evrazia.org contains links to oth-
er portals of the Eurasian Movement (http://evrazia.info/), Vehi 
TV portal (http://vehi.tv/index.php?module=main); Eurasia TV 
portal (http://www.evrazia.tv/) and Knigi Evrazii portal (http://
www.evrazia-books.ru/). All of them contain links to Dugin’s 
publications and publish recent announcements made by the 
leader and his associates.
In turn, Dugin’s academic achievements can be accessed on the 
websites http://konservatizm.org/ and http://ru-neokons.live-
journal.com/ (the site of the Centre for Neoconservative Stud-
ies), the analytical portal http://geopolitika.ru and the multi-
media portal http://www.socium.tv/node/40. His articles and 
announcements are also tweeted and posted to social networking 
services (Twitter, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, VKontakte), where 
he has created his discussion groups. Dugin was an especially ac-
tive opinion leader during the Russian intervention in Crimea. 
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His geopolitical analyses provided grounds for all the theses put 
forward by official propaganda: for example, he claimed that the 
de-Russification problem had emerged in Ukraine, and appealing 
that Russian patriotism should be accorded the rank of ‘scientific 
patriotism’ (such as that of ‘scientific communism’), etc.
The extensive network of online contacts has helped Dugin gain 
a great number of fanatic supporters (judging from the opinions 
expressed by them online), which are grouped into a form of ‘spir-
itual colonies’ – from fascism-inclined ‘Natsbols’ through sociol-
ogy and philosophy students from Moscow University to foreign 
fans of his fourth theory and Eurasianism (for example, the Pol-
ish portal xportal.pl). They form separate chains of information 
impact, and these chains form a homogenous communication 
network. They are mobilised to act, and their online actions are 
extremely dynamic, aggressive and uncompromising.
5. network institutionalisation
There is a huge gap between online civil society and information 
spetsnazes. Instead of spontaneously formed discussion groups, 
these are organised and hierarchical structures controlled by 
headquarters and commissioners. Part of the formal and infor-
mal movements and organisations which share Dugin’s views 
established the ‘Russian Spring’ Coalition on 13 March 2014. The 
founding declaration was signed by: Valery Korovin (Centre for 
Geopolitical Expertise), Aleksandr Notin (head of the Cultural and 
Education Association ‘Pereprava’), Aleksandr Bovdunov (federal 
commissioner of the Eurasian Youth Union), Vladimir Khomya-
kov (co-president of the Velikoye Otechestvo party), Andrei Ko-
valenko (leader of the Eurasian Youth Union and the Natsional-
ny Kurs party), Alexey Zhilin (leader of the Conservative-Right 
Association), Aleksandr Shtilmark (head of the Black Hundreds 
organisation), Anton Yermolayev (leader of the National Alli-
ance), Aleksandr Matyukhin (leader of the Samoderzhavnaya 
Rossiya movement) and Dragan Stanojevic (leader of the United 
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Serb Diaspora of Eurasia). The list of signatories proves that this 
is quite an eclectic alliance: of conservative radicals with leftists, 
nationalists and monarchists, and of experts with militants.
Institutionalised forms of operation of the organisations which fit 
in with the Eurasian ideological trend make it possible to use the 
so-called ‘swarm technology’ online. The network headquar-
ters guides ‘its’ people, controls them, corrects their statements 
and gives them instructions. They are used for the Kremlin’s po-
litical purposes, motivated by the patriotic mission. This technol-
ogy is also successful because it has massive coverage: Dugin’s 
network is just one of a multitude of similar ‘swarms’ which sing 
the Kremlin’s propaganda songs written for many voices. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning the portal which specialises in 
the information warfare topic – http://ruxpert.ru. A long list of 
pro-Kremlin internet forums (http://aftershoc; http://avanturist.
org; http://vmestepobedim.org; http://kontra20.ru; http://odna-
ko.org, http://ruska-prawda.com, http://politrash.ru) and blogs 
written by so-called ‘patriots’ (see for example: http://nstarikov.
ru/blog/9558) can be found on this portal.
A great deal of attention has recently been given to Russian dias-
pora portals which have joined in Russia’s information warfare 
(http://baltija.eu, http://glagol.in.ua, http://imperiya.by and oth-
ers). Yuri Baranchik, an ethnic Russian from Belarus, who until 
recently presented himself as an administrator of the imperiya.
by portal, now signs his texts as “executive director of the Infor-
mation Warfare Institute, Moscow.” Many new news agencies 
and portals have been created. For example, the agencies Rex, 
ostkraft.ru, cominf.org and probably also regcomment.ru, zapa-
drus.su, iines.org and stoletije.ru originated from Regnum, the 
news agency targeted at countries in the near abroad and Russia’s 
north-western neighbours. They are linked in that they share the 
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same group of experts (opinion leaders), a long list of whom can be 
found on IA Rex website24.
6. Innovations in real life
Innovations can also be observed in real life. Disinformation 
through action is an equivalent of verbal disinformation used for 
propaganda purposes. For example, two ‘peace marches’ were seen 
in Moscow on 17 March 2014: a demonstration of opponents of the 
incorporation of Crimea and a ‘peaceful’ demonstration, as Rus-
sian television branded it, held by the paramilitary organisation 
‘The Essence of Time’ led by the fascist-leaning Stalinist, Sergey 
Kurginyan. Participants of the ‘competitive’ peace march were 
wearing red jackets with military-styled shoulder boards, with 
stars and the letters SV embroidered on them (standing for “The 
Essence of Time”, which is Суть Времени in Russian). Around 
15,000 people participated in this demonstration according to es-
timates made by the daily, Moskovsky Komsomolets. Other media 
reported that the office of the Moscow mayor had granted consent 
to a demonstration of 4,000 people. Young people and war veter-
ans were marching in equal columns – they evidently hold drills 
before such events. After the parade, the participants of the march 
stopped at Revolution Square to listen to a speech by Kurginyan. 
Among what he said was: “The government in Kyiv is formed by 
Bandera scum, who extend their dirty hands as a Nazi salute. (…) 
There will be no Maidan in Moscow. We shall not allow this.”
The so-called ‘nice men’, the armed military officers wearing 
uniforms without insignia, who came to Crimea at night between 
1 and 2 March, were also engaged in active disinformation. They 
occupied the airport in Sevastopol in order to defend it, as they ex-
plained, from an “air assault by Bandera commandos from Kyiv.” 
The airport’s press service announced in the morning that the 
“soldiers were very nice, and when they had made sure that the 
24 See: http://www.iarex.ru/experts/ – accessed on 26 March 2014.
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airport was under no risk of air assault, they apologised and left 
the airport.” When this news was spread across the globe, they 
came back to the airport and occupied other strategic facilities in 
Crimea. The ‘nice men’ have also been used in propaganda as an 
example of bloodless solutions to the problems in Crimea. Presi-
dent Putin has also mentioned them: “Around 100 people were 
killed during the ‘peaceful Maidan’, while no one was even injured 
at the time of the so-called ‘military intervention’ in Crimea.”
Some of the elements designed to reinforce propaganda (the red 
jackets, Saint George ribbons and the ‘flag holiday’) belong to the 
symbolic and socio-cultural sphere which unites Russians and 
the Russian-speaking citizens of the countries which emerged 
following the collapse of the USSR.
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concluSIon
State policy
The incorporation of Crimea and the information warfare that 
accompanied it were an effect of the policy aimed at strengthen-
ing the state, reconstructing Russia’s spheres of influence and 
mobilising the public; this has been consistently applied for years 
now. It has also been conducted in tandem with the policy out-
lined in the Information Security Doctrine in 2000, which lists 
among the key threats “the spread of disinformation about Russia 
and the federal state authorities.” The presidential programmes 
launched over the past few years have also been used to neutral-
ise ‘information warfare’ waged against the Russian Federation. 
These programmes include “Building a positive image of the Rus-
sian Federation,” “Improving Russian information security” and 
“Building a single information space in Russia”, and have been 
employed by President Putin to serve the purposes of reinforc-
ing the civil identity of the multi-ethnic population of the Russian 
Federation25.
The external dimension of this policy is an effect of the Kremlin’s 
belief that attempts are being made to influence the processes 
taking place in Russia and the post-Soviet area. The ‘scientific’ 
grounds for this belief are provided by the geopolitical doctrine 
which calls for informational aggression to be directed mainly 
against Russia’s geopolitical opponents (the West – above all, the 
USA and NATO).
This policy is also strongly influenced by the power elite whose 
careers started in the secret services; they have adopted a strate-
gy of rivalry with the external world. Manifestations of this strat-
egy include: the act on non-governmental organisations funded 
by foreign entities, which must be listed in the register of ‘foreign 
25 Kremlin.ru, 12 February 2013, volgapress.ru, 9 February 2013.
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agents’ (2012), the anti-gay act (2013), and above all the consistent 
building of the scientific and research base dealing with informa-
tion warfare, as well as developing the base to ensure organisa-
tional, media, ideological, legislative, diplomatic, social, academic 
and culture circles’ along with other support.
An old product in new packaging
The recently observed Russian information and network warfare 
should be viewed as a product of traditional political technologies 
which have been in use for years and which were inherited from 
the USSR. The contemporary Russian informational geopolitics, 
which uses in its theoretical deliberations a kind of ‘ideologi-
cal newspeak’, clearly draws upon Soviet psychological warfare 
and Soviet mental stereotypes. It had to take into consideration 
new media tools (the Internet). However, these innovations pri-
marily concern the organisation of activity within the network. 
Propaganda remains the key instrument of information war-
fare. Its distinctive features are language (the language of emo-
tions and judgments, and not of facts), content (compliance with 
the Kremlin’s official propaganda) and function (discrediting the 
opponent). One might wonder whether this instrument could 
make it possible for Russia to launch a new ideological crusade in 
the West. The Russian propaganda message is rather incredible 
and easy to verify in the era of new technologies. Furthermore, 
the propagated ideas are not appealing. However, the ideological 
newspeak based on disinformation falls on fertile socio-cultural 
ground in the East.
russia’s allies
The Russian-speaking diaspora, who have maintained cultural 
and emotional bonds with Russia, was Russia’s main ally during 
the Crimean operation. The linguistic space where Russian is 
used was also one of the factors which contributed to the success-
ful action. This is also a convenient information and media space, 
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and one receptive to Russian propaganda. Furthermore, the post-
Soviet area (including Ukraine) is also thoroughly reconnoitred 
and permeated with the aid of agents of influence originating 
from the multitude of Russian diaspora organisations. The view-
point of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine facilitated Russia in 
the achievement of its goals during the Crimean operation. They 
have been won over as a consequence of long-lasting propaganda 
backed with sabotage actions in Crimea. However, Russia has re-
sorted to military solutions, forcing those unconvinced into obe-
dience, even here, where the public is receptive to its ideas.
The Western public is less receptive to Russian disinformation: 
they have not been convinced by Russian argumentation that the 
annexation has saved Crimea from the cruelty of “Banderivtsy 
and fascists from the Maidan.” They are fully aware that the ‘new’ 
project of ‘conservative revolution’, i.e. de-Americanisation of the 
world, including Europe, being promoted by Russia, is unattrac-
tive, nothing new and in fact means setting the partition lines be-
tween the spheres of influences.
It is however worth noting the fact that the message addressed to 
the West is modified and spread via specialist media (The Voice of 
Russia and TV RT). The official websites of Russian institutions, 
for example the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which interprets 
current affairs in a more sophisticated manner, are also targeted 
at the Western audience. Disinformation provided here has been 
and will continue to be more difficult to decipher. In the case of 
the Voice of Russia radio station and TV RT, disinformation is also 
spread by local opinion leaders. Different wording is used here, 
but manipulation is also inherent in this wording (“Russians have 
the right to be patriots, as well,” “the government wants Russia 
to be rich and free,” “the power of Putin and the Kremlin is based 
on the people’s choice”). This wording draws upon generally re-
spected values. Russians also play on the various motivations of 
various social groups in the West (using pacifists’ fear of war, pol-
iticians’ fear of unpredictability and entrepreneurs’ fear of losses; 
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and explaining to experts why Western models will not work for 
example in Ukraine). Furthermore, public opinion is not aware of 
the fact that they are the object of a planned and coordinated in-
formation struggle.
the future of information warfare
Russian information warfare is set to continue since Putin’s new 
doctrine has crystallised. This doctrine is geopolitical, Eurasian, 
anti-liberal and oriented towards rivalry with the West and Rus-
sia’s dominance in Eurasia. For this reason, the key tasks of ra-
tional public debate is and will continue in the immediate future 
to be to set limits on the space available to Russian political myths 
and ideologised propaganda actions, and to explain the mecha-
nisms and goals of such actions.
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